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Monetary policy makers need to build two pillars for their inflation targeting strategy. Firstly, a
methodology for producing the central forecast should be developed, since the whole decision
process is more easily organised around a model forecast. Secondly, a methodology for dealing
with uncertainties is equally important, because a poor evaluation of uncertainties can
significantly reduce the quality of monetary policy decisions. Reflecting the further progress of
the methodological debate inside the CNB, this paper aims to provide suggestions to policy
makers as to which methods could be used to assess uncertainty during the monetary policy
decision process. Suggestions for each stage of the process are summarised in the final chapter.
These take into account the findings of surveys of three very distinct sources – the economic
literature on monetary policy under uncertainty, the managerial literature on decision analysis,
and the real-life strategies of five central banks. The lessons from these three surveys are
presented in separate chapters.
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Nontechnical summary
Monetary policy makers need to build two pillars for their inflation targeting strategy. Firstly, a
methodology for producing the central forecast should be developed, since the whole decision
process is more easily organised around a model forecast. Secondly, a methodology for dealing
with uncertainties is equally important, because a poor evaluation of uncertainties can
significantly reduce the quality of monetary policy decisions. Reflecting the further progress of
the methodological debate inside the CNB, this paper aims to provide suggestions to policy
makers as to which methods could be used to assess uncertainty during the monetary policy
decision process. While there is a consensus that the decision process should be organised around
the model forecast, it is much more difficult to develop an effective methodology for dealing with
uncertainty. Since there are no easy solutions in this area, we formulate our suggestions taking
into account the findings of surveys of three very distinct sources – the economic literature on
monetary policy under uncertainty, the managerial literature on decision analysis, and the real-life
strategies of five central banks.
There are two essential reasons why policy makers need a good methodology for dealing with
uncertainty. Firstly, if an inadequate methodology is applied to dealing with uncertainty, it can
lead to defects in the decision-making process. If uncertainty is neglected and policy interest rates
are changed only according to the central forecast, changes in policy interest rates can be too large
or too small with respect to the optimal policy response. Sub-optimal policy reactions can burden
the economy with otherwise avoidable costs. If, on the other hand, the selected methodology tries
to take in too many uncertainties during the decision-making process, it can produce interval
forecasts that are too wide. Any comparison of these inflation forecasts with the inflation target
then cannot give policy makers a clear picture of how to deal with interest rates. Secondly, a lack
of communication about the uncertainty attached to the central forecast can lead the general public
to think that any deviation of actual inflation from the forecast is the result of monetary policy
errors. Hence, too little information on uncertainty can damage the credibility of the whole
inflation targeting strategy, and this damage can be costly for the economy.
There is a whole stream of literature on monetary policy under uncertainty which illustrates that
monetary policy makers are faced with different types of uncertainty, for example, parameter
uncertainty, model uncertainty or data uncertainty, and each type has its specific implications for
monetary policy decisions. In the typical research paper, a model of the economy with
endogenous monetary policy is used to produce the baseline simulation. Then a selected type of
uncertainty is introduced, and the outcome of the new simulation is compared to the baseline.
Depending on the type of uncertainty selected, the new interest rate path is more or less volatile
than the baseline one. Based on this analysis, the conclusion is derived that policy makers should
react more aggressively or more cautiously if they are faced with uncertainty. Since the
conclusion is dependent on the model used for the simulations as well as on other components of
the selected methodology, one can find different conclusions for similar types of uncertainty. This
is one source of discomfort to policy makers. In addition, in their papers, policy makers often
emphasise that the uncertainty they face in real life when deciding about interest rates is different
from the one analysed in the research papers. The former cannot be easily described with a
probability distribution, whereas the latter is typically represented with a normal probability
distribution.Targeting inflation under uncertainty: Policy makers’ perspective   3
The discomfort of monetary policy makers with the outcomes of economic research is similar to
the discomfort of decision makers in other areas. All decision makers face uncertainty. They can
use the outcomes of mathematical models and statistical techniques as important inputs into their
decision process. However, they cannot rely solely on them. Decision makers need to combine
various types of information, including various sensitivity tests and subjective judgements.
Therefore, we suggest learning from other sources, not just from the economic research literature,
about effective methodology for dealing with uncertainty. Since the necessity of deciding on
important issues under uncertainty is not a problem solely related to monetary policy decisions,
there is a very large demand for methods for overcoming this problem. For this purpose, decision
theory and decision analysis offer various tools for all stages of the decision-making process.
Some tools rooted in mathematics, such as forecasting models and stochastic optimisation, are
designed to organise all the available data. Other decision analysis tools that are less
mathematically rigorous, such as pay-off matrices and decision trees, work with other types of
information. Specifically, these tools use subjective evaluation of uncertainties and are aimed at
reaching good decisions in an uncertain world.
We confront the findings from the literature with the “real-life” methods that five inflation
targeters employ in dealing with uncertainty in the internal decision-making process as well as in
communication with the general public. The case studies, based on publicly available sources,
document that monetary policy makers do not limit themselves to producing the central forecast
when deciding about interest rates. They follow the methods recommended by decision analysis,
however informal or implicit this may be. In the first step, policy makers use various forecasting
techniques in order to organise the data. In the second step, they use intentionally a combination
of several methods for dealing with uncertainty. Some of the methods are very close analogies to
the methods recommended by decision analysis. For example, several central banks attach
subjective distributions to the central forecast in order to produce fan charts. Several banks use
alternative scenarios to deal with their uncertainty about important external factors such as
commodity prices. Some central banks also let a group of experts vote prior to the meeting of the
monetary policy committee on the optimal policy reaction.
We highlight the following points as far as dealing with uncertainty is concerned. It is important
to employ a methodology that helps to organise very different types of information, for example
the central projection and subjective probabilities, into one framework. For this purpose, decision
analysis offers a very convenient tool in the form of the pay-off matrix. We suggest using the pay-
off matrix informally. The process of constructing the matrix corresponds to the individual stages
of the monetary decision process. It is possible to choose from various methods for constructing
each particular component of the matrix. The central forecast is the first element of the matrix to
be constructed. Then several alternative sets of assumptions are specified that illustrate key
uncertainties about the model or some assumption of the central forecast. Also, all feasible policy
reactions are spelled out. For all important combinations of alternative assumptions and feasible
reactions, the model simulations are conducted and pay-offs are evaluated. In the next stage,
subjective probabilities that can imply asymmetric distributions around the central forecast are
attached to the alternative assumptions. Finally, monetary policy makers may choose between
various decision strategies to determine the best policy reaction. It is worth noting that under
certain circumstances an incomplete pay-off matrix can be sufficient for monetary policy
decisions. However, in a period of considerable uncertainty, all components of the matrix should
be informally constructed prior to the final verdict on policy interest rates.4  Kateřina Šmídková
1. Introduction
The rapidly increasing number of inflation targeters is proof that inflation targeting in the current
environment is an effective strategy for stabilising inflation. However, everything comes at a
price. This high efficiency goes hand in hand with increased demands on the quality of the
decision-making process and communication with the general public. It is no coincidence that
research on the implications of uncertainty for conducting monetary policy has increased
significantly over the last decade, as illustrated in Hund, Orr (1999) or Salmon, Martin (1999).
This was a period in which inflation targeters were developing their methodologies for producing
the best possible inflation forecasts, given the constraints of imperfect knowledge about the
current state of the economy and even less perfect knowledge about future economic events.
Although the inflation targeting framework has reduced uncertainty about the goals and
instruments of monetary policy, policy makers targeting inflation will always be decision makers
reaching their verdicts about interest rates under considerable uncertainty, and thus will always
search for methods that can reduce the negative consequences of uncertainty on the quality of
decisions and communication.
There are two essential reasons why inflation targeters need good methodology for dealing with
uncertainty. Firstly, monetary policy makers need to make qualified decisions about the policy
interest rates. Unless a suitable methodology is applied to dealing with uncertainty, imperfect
knowledge about the current and future state of the economy can lead to defects in the decision-
making process. Specifically, uncertainty can be neglected, and the policy interest rates can be
changed only according to the central inflation forecast. This implies, as illustrated in Brainard
(1967) or in Leiderman (1999), that changes in policy interest rates can be too large or too small
with respect to an optimal policy response, and that sub-optimal policy reactions can burden the
economy with otherwise avoidable costs, for example with excessive output loss. If – on the other
hand – the selected methodology tries to take in too many uncertainties during the decision-
making process, it can produce too many alternative inflation forecasts or interval forecasts that
are too wide. Any comparison of these inflation forecasts with the inflation target then cannot give
policy makers a clear picture of how to deal with interest rates. For example, one alternative
forecast can be above the target while the other one can be very close to the target, signalling the
need to increase policy rates and to leave them unchanged at the same time.
The second important reason why central bankers need good methodology for dealing with
uncertainty is to make the inflation targeting framework transparent. The credibility of the
inflation targeting strategy depends on transparency, and the loss of monetary policy credibility
can be costly for the economy, as analysed in Geraats (2001). The lack of communication about
the uncertainty attached to the central inflation forecast can lead the general public to thinking that
this forecast is fully unconditional and that any deviation of actual inflation from the forecast is
the result of monetary policy errors. Hence, too little information on uncertainty can damage the
credibility of the whole inflation targeting strategy. Similar damage can be caused by the
disorganised way uncertainty, resulting from the forecasts of exogenous variables, the forecasting
model or additional off-model information, is communicated. An unclear message about the
methods of dealing with uncertainty and evaluation of the key uncertainties for a particular
decision on policy interest rates can prevent financial markets from understanding the direction ofTargeting inflation under uncertainty: Policy makers’ perspective   5
monetary policy and the general public from distinguishing the consequences of unforeseen
external shocks from policy errors.
The Czech National Bank (CNB) started targeting inflation in 1998. During these five years, the
Czech approach to inflation targeting has gone through several stages of development relating to
in-house knowledge and surrounding conditions. During each stage of development, the method
of dealing with uncertainty has been different. The experience gained is similar to that of “senior”
inflation targeters, who have been gradually improving their methodologies since the beginning of
the 1990s. Initially, the CNB described the inflation outlook verbally. In the subsequent stage, the
CNB started publishing the year-end interval inflation forecast. After the modelling knowledge
reached the required level of development, the year-end forecast was replaced with publication of
a chart representing the inflation outlook for the whole period of transmission. The chart is based
on the forecast that uses the model projection with endogenous monetary policy in combination
with expert input. The bands surrounding the central forecast and the verbal description of risks
illustrate that monetary decisions are subject to uncertainty. This description of the current stage
implies that, while the methodology for producing the central forecast is comparable to the
approaches of other inflation targeters, there is still a lot to be learnt as far as the methodology for
dealing with uncertainty is concerned. Before an explicit choice for this methodology is made, we
think that it is very important to compare all methods available either in the literature on monetary
policy under uncertainty, in the literature on decision analysis or in case studies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The second chapter reviews the conclusions of the
literature on monetary policy under uncertainty. The conclusions show clearly that unless the
world can be sufficiently well approximated with quadratic-linear models and additive, normally
distributed shocks, monetary policy makers should not neglect uncertainty. In a more complicated
world, policy reactions formed under the assumption of certainty are likely to departure from the
optimal policy path. The literature also emphasises that monetary policy makers are faced with
different types of uncertainty, for example, parameter uncertainty, model uncertainty or data
uncertainty, and each type has its specific implications for monetary policy makers. In their
papers, policy makers often explain that models and policy rules cannot explain fully monetary
policy decisions due to their lack of ability to deal with uncertainty faced by policy makers. Policy
makers emphasise that the economic research has focused primarily on implications of risks, not
uncertainty. Although the literature on monetary policy under uncertainty is extensive, it does not
offer explicit advice on which methodology is effective when deciding about interest rates under
uncertainty. We suggest searching elsewhere for an effective methodology. Therefore, we present
the findings of decision theory and decision analysis in the third chapter. The necessity of
deciding on the important issues under uncertainty is not a problem solely related to monetary
policy decisions. Every decision maker deals with uncertainty, and hence, demand for methods on
how to overcome this problem is very large. For this purpose, decision theory and decision
analysis offer various tools for all stages of the decision-making process. Some tools rooted in
mathematics, such as forecasting models or stochastic optimisation, are designed to organise all
available data. They are very similar to tools used by inflation targeters for producing the central
projection. Other decision analysis tools that are less mathematically rigorous, such as a pay-off
matrix or decision trees, work with other types of information. Specifically, these tools use the
subjective evaluation of uncertainties and are aimed at reaching good decisions in an uncertain
world. These less formal tools resemble some methods used by inflation targeters, such as
subjective distributions on fan charts. In the fourth chapter, five case studies are briefly described.6  Kateřina Šmídková
These studies illustrate the “real-life” methods of five inflation targeters in dealing with
uncertainty in the internal decision-making process as well as in communication with the general
public. The case studies document that policy makers do not limit themselves to producing the
central forecast when deciding about interest rates. In addition to the model forecast, they use
intentionally several methods for dealing with uncertainty. Some methods are very close analogies
to the methods recommended by decision analysis. In the conclusive part, we highlight several
lessons for the Czech approach to inflation targeting as far as dealing with uncertainty is
concerned. Specifically, we suggest using the pay-off matrix informally and propose various
methods of constructing the matrix. The methodology provided by this tool from decision analysis
can help in consistently evaluating all of the important uncertainties during monetary policy
decisions.
2. Uncertainty in recent literature on monetary policy
Literature overview
During the 1990s, issues related to uncertainty played an increasingly more important role in
monetary policy literature. A tremendous motivation for research was provided by the increasing
number of inflation-targeting central banks. All research papers emphasise that the starting point
of this debate is the analysis presented already in Brainard (1967). He claimed that policy makers
faced by uncertainty about their model of the economy should react differently with policy
interest rates than policy makers who are fully certain about their knowledge of the economy. For
his analysis, he used a specific type of the model framework called “linear-quadratic” due to
functional forms of model equations. Then he introduced uncertainty about one of the parameters
in the model. He has concluded that monetary policy makers should react less with policy interest
rates in the presence of parameter uncertainty than in the case of certainty. The framework used
by the current research papers is analogous. One example of the quadratic-linear framework is
described in Appendix I. In these papers, a specific type of uncertainty is usually introduced into
the model in order to explain why outcomes of policy rules differ from the reactions of central
bankers. Hence, the main emphasis is on explaining differences between the model and real life.
However, policy makers have different motivation that has been illustrated in Battini, Haldane
(1999). They show that if policy makers targeting inflation react too aggressively or are too
cautious when changing policy interest rates, it is costly for the economy in terms of excessive
output and inflation volatility. Policy makers should know what types of uncertainty they face and
what the implications are for optimal policy reaction in comparison to the certainty case.
Otherwise, their policy reactions based solely on the forecasts produced under the certainty
assumption would be too costly for the economy.
Referring to Brainard’s pioneering paper that has focused on one specific case of the parameter
uncertainty, the recent literature has focused on classification of the alternative sources of
uncertainty faced by monetary policy makers, and on analysing the consequences of different
types of uncertainty for monetary policy decisions. This stream of literature has illustrated that it
is not possible to use Brainard’s rule as a rule of thumb, since a more aggressive reaction in
comparison to the certainty case is required from policy makers under other types of uncertainty.
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distinguishing between risk and uncertainty. The difference between risk and uncertainty has been
defined by Knight (1921) in the second pioneering paper on uncertainty. According to him, if
policy makers are able to estimate probability distribution of a certain event, this event is called a
risk. If policy makers cannot obtain the probability distribution, they deal with uncertainty. In this
period, the problem of uncertainty was also addressed by Hicks (1931) or by Keynes (1936).
Policy makers were the first to emphasise that literature on policy rules and uncertainty, in fact,
deals with risks only, for example, Blinder (1998) or Issing (1999). In the policy papers, one can
repeatedly find comments stating that, while problems of risks are well covered by economic
literature, it is, in fact, the problem of uncertainty that makes the lives of monetary policy makers
difficult. After these claims had been made, the academic research on policy rules started to
consider the difference between risk and uncertainty as well.
Methodology issues
The methodology of analysing uncertainty used in recent literature on monetary policy has been
summarised in Srour (1999) or Taylor (1999) who has also given a name to it: “new normative
macroeconomics”. The typical paper consists of a (linear or non-linear) model of the economy
and a policy rule representing policy reaction. The rule can be either simple, based on pragmatic
observation, or it can be derived from the loss function of a central bank in the model. The case of
certainty is usually taken as a benchmark for the analysis of the consequences of a selected case of
uncertainty for monetary policy reactions. According to the selected model and the type of
uncertainty, the comparison of the certainty benchmark to the uncertainty case suggests that
monetary policy should be more aggressive under uncertainty or that monetary policy should be
more cautious under uncertainty. Numerous studies, for example, Sgherri, Wallis (1997), Drew,
Hunt (1999), Shuetrim, Thompson (1999), Srour (1999) or Cagliarini, Heath (2000), emphasise
that monetary policy makers should not derive any rule of thumb from the academic research
papers since the results are not independent from the model.
In this context, it is worth noting that academic research papers more frequently deal with the
specific cases of uncertainties than with discussing the implications of the multiple appearance of
uncertainty. The case would correspond more to a standard situation of policy makers who are
usually faced with a combination of several different uncertainties. Authors who have introduced
a specific type of uncertainty into their models in order to explain why policy rules differ from the
reactions of central bankers have been aware of this problem. For example, Smets (1999)
concludes that the introduction of output gap uncertainty in the optimal control exercise is not
sufficient for explaining why the reactions of central bankers are more cautious than the reactions
suggested by the policy rules in the model. Srour (1999) emphasises that if there are several
uncertain parameters in the model, it is not possible to conclude a priori whether policy makers
should react with interest rates more aggressively or be more cautious than in the certainty case,
and that this multiple uncertainty can be so large that it leads to a policy of no interest rate
changes.
One of the most interesting debates is about an appropriate methodology for dealing with model
uncertainty. This debate employs rather technical terminology. For the purpose of this paper,
several frequently used concepts are summarised in Appendix II. Some studies, for example
Levin, Wieland, Williams (1999) or Tetlow, von zur Muehlen (2000), employ a robust control
method. It relies on using several models rather than only one when searching for suitable policy8  Kateřina Šmídková
rules. On the other hand, Sims (2001) claims that this method does not offer a substitute for
assessing probabilities. Cagliarini, Heath (2000) prefer an alternative methodology that uses the
inertia assumption in a simple optimal control problem. According to them, the robust control
method based on minimax principle leads incorrectly to selection of a model from the range of
available models in which monetary policy is the least effective. As a result, under higher
uncertainty, policy makers are recommended to react more aggressively than in the case of
certainty. Cagliarini, Heath (2000) claim that this conclusion does not correspond well to the
central bankers behaviour that is better approximated with the inertia assumption. Then the
presence of Knightian uncertainty implies lower volatility of interest rates and lower frequency of
interest rate changes than in the certainty case, since the algorithm is based on the “envelope”
approach and considers all possible distributions. To sum up, due to the different methodologies
employed, there is disagreement on the implications of model uncertainty for policy reactions.
Another interesting discussion deals with the scope of uncertainty faced by monetary policy
makers. Specifically, for the UK case, Haldane, Salmon (1995) have conducted a study for the
Bank of England in order to estimate how often it is likely to miss the inflation target. Their
results showed that inflation can be outside the targeted range (1.5%–3.5%) 85% of the time. On
the other hand, Sgherri, Wallis (1997) estimated that inflation uncertainty is much lower than the
above-reported number. For their analysis, they employed the same model as Haldane, Salmon
(1995) but have made several modifications such as adding an exchange-rate equation or
recalculating the covariance matrix for shocks. The result is that inflation should be in a two-
percent targeted range two-thirds of the time. In addition to the above-mentioned topic, there is
another emerging stream of literature on monetary policy under uncertainty represented, for
example, by Isard, Laxton (1999) or Tetlow, von zur Muehlen, Finan (1999), related to
modification of the standard framework by introducing learning elements.    
The difference between risk and uncertainty
There is a significant difference between risk and uncertainty that has not been always expressed
identically in all papers dealing with monetary policy under uncertainty. It is important to be
aware of this difference, because policy makers use different methods to deal with risks and
different methods to deal with uncertainties. According to Knight (1921), policy makers face a
risk if they have a reliable estimate of its probability distribution available during their decisions.
They are faced with uncertainty if a relevant probability distribution cannot be calculated.
Following Knight’s definition, one can conclude that many academic papers on monetary policy
under uncertainty focus, in fact, on analysing the implications of risks. This inconsistency has
been observed by policy makers, for example, by Blinder (1998) or Issing (1999). There are
research papers such as Cagliarini, Heath (2000) or Tetlow, von zur Muehlen (2000) dealing with
the problem of model uncertainty that is the closest approximation of Knight’s definition of
uncertainty but, as was mentioned already, agreement on an adequate methodology has not been
reached yet.
In this paper, the Knightian concept of uncertainty is used because this concept allows us to group
methods for policy makers into two categories. Specifically, forecasting models, including
stochastic models, are very good tools for dealing with risks. Their value to policy makers is
illustrated in Blinder (1998). We would like to put emphasis on the fact that other methods are
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theory and decision analysis can be very useful. Recent economic literature has also looked in this
direction for inspiration. Cagliarini, Heath (2000) use terminology very similar to that used in
decision theory and decision analysis. They distinguish between risks for which expected values
of pay-offs can be evaluated and between uncertainties to which policy makers need to attach
subjective probabilities. Both concepts –pay-off and subjective probability – are parts of pay-off
matrix. We would like to recommend this tool of decision analysis to attention of monetary policy
makers. The concepts and tools of decision theory and decision analysis will be reviewed in the
next chapter. The basic terminology is summarised in Appendix II.
Implications of alternative types of uncertainty
If monetary policy makers targeting inflation lived in a certain world that is similar to the world of
linear models and quadratic loss functions, it would be easy for them to calculate the optimal path
for policy interest rates with the help of model. However, policy makers are often not certain
about the values of specific parameters, about the functional form of a specific model equation
and – even worse – about the model, used for forecasting inflation, itself. Each type of uncertainty
implies that the optimal policy reaction could differ from the one suggested by the benchmark
model simulation. There are many types of uncertainty that one can find described and analysed in
various papers. Specifically, Freedman (1999) presents one possible classification of uncertainties
from the policy makers’ perspective. He makes a distinction between additive uncertainty,
multiplicative uncertainty, model uncertainty, uncertainty about data and about the output gap.
Clements, Hendry (1994) put more emphasis on the econometric background of the models and
decompose the forecast errors into structural shifts, model misspecifications, additive shocks
affecting endogenous variables, data noise, and parameter estimation errors. Srour (1999) pays
attention to uncertainty about coefficients, time lags, and the nature of shocks. Hall, Salmon,
Yates, Batini (1999) suggest comparing two types of uncertainty in the quadratic-linear stochastic
model. In their case, implications of additive uncertainty are analysed within the benchmark
stochastic model and implications of multiplicative uncertainty with parameters that are all
stochastic.
In order to describe the implications of alternative types of uncertainty for an optimal policy
reaction, we find it useful to distinguish between three categories of uncertainty: additive,
multiplicative and off-model uncertainty. Each category has a different implication for monetary
policy makers, additive uncertainty being the easiest one to handle and off-model uncertainty
being the most difficult one. As the following summary of research findings illustrates, even
within one category, one cannot derive unambiguous conclusions for the optimal policy response,
since the conclusions differ according to the employed methodology and also according to the
model used for the particular research. Nevertheless, one can receive one very clear message from
the literature on monetary policy under uncertainty. The uncertainty should not be neglected when
decisions about policy interest rates are made since it can have a considerable impact on how the
optimal path for interest rates is perceived.
Additive uncertainty, which is sometimes also called linear uncertainty, does not pose a serious
problem for monetary policy makers. Various studies, for example Hall, Salmon, Yates, Batini
(1999) or Srour (1999), illustrate that, under additive uncertainty, optimal policy reactions are
identical to the certainty case. Monetary policy makers can be confronted with this type of
uncertainty when they are unsure about time lags or when they need to attach normally distributed10  Kateřina Šmídková
error terms to individual equations, but only if their forecasting model is in a quadratic-linear
form. The intuition behind this conclusion is explained, for example in Wallis (forthcoming). It is
only in the linear models with quadratic loss functions and normally distributed additive shocks
that the decision-maker– according to the certainty equivalence theorem – can reduce its decision
problem from focusing on the forecast representing all uncertainties to focusing only on the point
forecast based on expected values.
Multiplicative uncertainty, which is also referred to as non-linear, does create a problem for
monetary policy makers. It can take the form of one uncertain coefficient, more uncertain
coefficients or uncertainty about the form of a specific equation. Conclusions then depend on the
model employed for analysis and the form of multiplicative uncertainty. Some studies, for
example Hall, Salmon, Yates, Batini (1999), Salmon, Martin (1999) or Freedman (1999), have
similar conclusions to Brainard (1967), i.e. monetary policy-makers should be more cautious in
the face of multiplicative uncertainty when responding to shocks than in the certainty case. Other
studies, for example Srour (1999) or Leiderman (1999), emphasise that conclusions depend on
which coefficient is uncertain. For example, uncertainty related to the elasticity of demand to
interest rates should lead to more cautious reactions from monetary policy makers, while
uncertainty related to the effect of inflation surprise on inflation should lead to more aggressive
policy reactions. Similarly, the cases of uncertainty related to expectations should lead to more
aggressive policy reactions, because a more cautious approach could damage the credibility of
monetary policy.
Several studies dealing with multiplicative or non-linear uncertainty pay specific attention to the
output gap and the NAIRU. Isard, Laxton, Eliasson (1999) analyse the consequences of the non-
linear convex Phillips curve and give several other examples of non-linearities that should be
subject to further research, such as the non-linear response of inflation expectations to the track
record of hitting the target, floors on nominal interest rates or asymmetry in hysteresis on the
labour market. Mishkin, Estrella (1999) study various uncertainties related to the NAIRU. Smets
(1999) analyses output gap uncertainty, and Drew, Hunt (1999) analyse the implications of
potential output uncertainty that, according to them, should lead to more aggressive policy
reactions than in the certainty case. All authors agree that implications of multiplicative and non-
linear uncertainties related to the output gap or the NAIRU are important for monetary policy
makers. However, any simple rule of thumb on whether the reaction should be more cautious or
more aggressive than in the certainty case is difficult to assert.
The third category of uncertainties monetary policy makers can face relates to uncertainties that
cannot be represented and analysed within the model used for forecasting inflation. The most
serious uncertainty in this category is whether the model provides a satisfactory representation of
the economy. In this case, monetary policy makers are uncertain about the model. They are in a
very difficult position, which can be illustrated by a broad variety of suggestions on how to
overcome this problem. On the one hand, Tetlow, von zur Muehlen (2000) use robust control to
analyse the implications of model uncertainty. Their results suggest that under uncertainty, policy
makers should react more aggressively than in the certainty case. On the other hand, the same
issue is analysed in Cagliarini, Heath (2000). However, a different methodology is used, and
implementation of the inertia assumption brings the opposite conclusion that, under model
uncertainty, policy makers should react more cautiously. Levin, Wieland, Williams (1999) test the
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simple rules work well with the whole range while complicated rules affected by forecasted
values are less robust to model uncertainty. They conclude that policy makers, if uncertain about
the model, should use simple rules based on the current output gap, current inflation and the
lagged policy rate. Freedman (1999) and Issing (1999) argue that model uncertainty should be
overcome by using several models.
Sometimes monetary policy makers may be uncertain only about a specific part of the model,
such as one particular assumption or equation. For example, the works of Sgherri, Wallis (1997),
Ball (2000) or Leitemo, Söderström (2001) illustrate that exchange-rate uncertainty and exchange-
rate model uncertainty are very important for small, open economies. Blinder (1999) emphasises
that it is important to further research a better specification of the equation linking long- and
short-term interest rates. The last important uncertainty, which is very difficult to resolve, is data
uncertainty. Orphanides (1998) explains that distorted data should be taken into account during
monetary policy decisions, and according to his analysis, policy reactions should be more cautious
under data uncertainty. Table 1 summarises the implications of all three categories of uncertainties
faced by policy makers when forecasting inflation.








Equation error in linear
model Risk None
Uncertain time lag in
linear model Risk None
Multiplicative
Non-linear
Uncertain coefficient(s) Risk More aggressive or cautious
(depending on the study)
Uncertain functional form
of Phillips curve Risk More cautious
Off-model Model uncertainty Uncertainty More aggressive or cautious
(depending on the study)
Assumption or equation
(fixed exchange rate) Uncertainty
More aggressive or cautious
(depending on the model)
Noise in data
Uncertainty More cautious
Note:  The described Knightian classification corresponds to the case of an estimated model. If the
model is calibrated, probability distributions cannot be derived.
Academic research versus policy papers
Until very recently, academic researchers have taken a different perspective on risk and
uncertainty than policy makers. In their papers, policy makers focus more on Knightian
uncertainty and on related issues, such as the role of forecast in the decision-making process,
while academic researchers, in most cases, analyse the implications of risks. Policy makers feel
that, since all their decisions are taken under Knightian uncertainty, it is not possible to
automatically follow the suggestions of policy rules from model simulations. We suggest that12  Kateřina Šmídková
their reactions correspond more to the conclusions of literature on decision analysis than to
literature on monetary policy under uncertainty. Another request made from the policy makers’
perspective has been to analyse the consequences of the multiple-case of uncertainty. Policy
makers are rarely so lucky to have doubts only about one coefficient in the model they use for
forecasting or about the functional form of only one equation.
Academic researchers admit that it has been difficult to explain the difference between the
reactions of policy makers that are usually cautious and between policy rules that suggest more
frequent and larger changes in policy interest rates. This difficulty has been an important
motivation for introducing uncertainty into academic research papers. However, the model
extensions used for this purpose have usually been too specific and too close to the Knightian
concept of risk to explain fully the observed difference between reactions suggested by model and
true reactions of policy makers. Mainly papers dealing with model uncertainty have come closer
to the Knightian uncertainty concept that explains the pattern of policy makers’ reactions better.
However, there have been studies, for example Blinder (1999) or Sims (2001), remarking that the
types of uncertainty analysed by academic research papers are not as important as some key
model assumptions that have not yet been subject to more stringent academic debate. Specifically,
the issues of the long-run trade-off between inflation and output, the mechanism of deflationary
spirals or new specifications of equations with well-known defects, such as an uncovered interest
parity equation or an equation linking long- and short-term interest rates, remain unanswered.
Summing up, the gap between the policy papers and academic research papers still prevails in the
new millennium, and agreement on methodology suitable for dealing with Knightian uncertainty
has not been reached yet in academic debate.
3. Uncertainty in literature on decision analysis
Decision analysis and monetary policy makers
It should not be surprising that monetary policy rules implemented into the core model do not
generate the same paths of policy interest rates that are then observed in reality. Their actual paths
are determined by policy makers who work under considerable uncertainty. The number and
magnitude of the risks and uncertainties that can be accounted for in the core model is only
limited. When policy makers feel that it is not safe to neglect uncertainties that could not be
accounted for in the core model, they must combine the information provided by the model with
other types of information, and consequently, react differently than their approximation in the
model. The need of monetary policy makers to combine various types of information, for example
the core model forecast with their own intuition, is not a problem solely related to monetary
policy decisions. In this chapter, we would like to draw attention to findings from the literature on
decision analysis (DA). DA has been developed to help decision-makers in various spheres - from
engineers developing new technology to army executive officers - to make qualified decisions
under uncertainty. Since the findings of DA are general, they can be applied to decisions on
monetary policy as well. We would like to use these findings to illustrate that, when deciding
about policy interest rates and communicating the outcome of policy decisions, it is not enough to
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same amount of effort used in developing the core forecasting model when developing a
methodology for dealing with risks and uncertainties, both internally and externally.
As was illustrated in the previous chapter, while typical risks can be taken care of within the
forecasting model framework, uncertainties are more difficult to handle. DA offers general
methods on how to make decisions under uncertainty. The DA terminology has mathematical
roots. The basic terminology used in this paper is explained in Appendix II. Although a direct
connection to DA literature has been only rarely made in literature on monetary policy under
uncertainty, monetary policy makers have been using DA methods, sometimes explicitly,
sometimes implicitly. For example, Blinder (1998) recommends that monetary policy makers
should use methods similar to dynamic programming when making their decisions. This is an
approach not very far removed from employing a decision tree as a tool for making decisions
under uncertainty. Blinder (1998) also recommends working with dynamic multipliers when
deriving their point estimates. Freedman (1999) recommends using a successive approximation
when making policy decisions on interest rates. Blinder (1998), Freedman (1999) and Issing
(1999) suggest that model uncertainty should be overcome by using several models and that a
more cautious approach to decisions on interest rates is a typical outcome of considering model
uncertainty during policy decisions. Budd (1998) and Issing (1999) emphasise that due to
Knightian uncertainty, simple policy rules do not present sufficient information for monetary
policy makers. Issing (1999) suggests that simple communication devices such as a single fan
chart cannot be used to present the full story to the general public.
These suggestions of monetary policy makers resemble very much the DA finding that it is
important to consider the whole set of information, not only some parts of it, when deciding under
uncertainty. According to DA, the whole information set consists of very different types of
information – ranging from a rigorous mathematical simulation to a purely subjective assessment
of event probabilities. We would like to emphasise this finding because DA offers a tool for
organising very different types of information into one framework that is very suitable for
monetary policy decisions. The tool is called the pay-off matrix. Although the name sounds
familiar, it does not have the same meaning as in the game theory. In the DA context, the pay-off
matrix is a rather pragmatic tool that helps to find optimal decisions under uncertainty. For
example, the pay-off matrix can be used prior to the actual decision in order to identify important
pieces of information that are missing and should be collected or approximated. According to DA,
after the pay-off matrix is filled with all available information, a selected decision rule determines
the outcome of the decision-process. Since there are various decision rules, decision makers can
select an adequate decision rule according to the problem they solve. One important feature of this
framework is that if the pay-off matrix is incomplete, some decision rules are not possible to
apply.
Illustration of the proposed methodology
Let us illustrate the methodology we propose for dealing with uncertainty faced by monetary
policy makers. Table 2 shows a pay-off matrix that represents all information considered typically
by policy makers: the central forecast, implications of alternative scenarios and alternative policy
reactions, and subjective probabilities. Various parts of the pay-off matrix correspond to various
stages of monetary decision process. In the first step, the core forecasting model and expert inputs
are used in order to produce the central forecast. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the14  Kateřina Šmídková
core forecasting model works with a fixed-rate assumption and that the central forecast is based
on the assumption of unchanged policy interest rates. The pay-off of the central forecast is
calculated according to subjective criteria selected by policy makers. In our example, the pay-off
is equal to the distance of the forecast from the inflation target in the transmission horizon. Hence,
the lower the pay-off, the better. The pay-off of the central forecast is located in the middle of the
pay-off matrix. In the second step, two alternative sets of assumptions that correspond to
situations in which significant deflation or inflation pressures prevail are specified. For these two
alternative sets, the pay-offs of the policy of unchanged interest rates are derived from the core
model simulations. It is worth emphasising that our example only illustrates the proposed
methodology. The pay-offs can be defined differently. Also, the issue of specifying the alternative
sets of assumptions is not an easy one. For example, under special circumstances, a completely
different model from the core one can be employed in order to produce the alternative
simulations. These issues will be discussed in more detail further in the text.
Table 2: The pay-off matrix of monetary policy makers








Subjective probabilities 0.4 0.5 0.1
Reduction in interest rates 03 5
No change in interest rates -1 1 * 4
Increase in interest rates -5 0.5 2.5
Note:  Pay-offs give a measurement in percentage points of the distance of the inflation forecast from
the inflation target cumulated over a selected time horizon.
*) This is the pay-off of the central forecast.
In the third step, consequences of all other possible policy reactions are considered in a similar
way. For the sake of simplicity, we consider three basic options - to leave policy interest rates
unchanged, to reduce them or to increase them. As a result of the second and the third step, there
are nine possibilities that are available to policy makers to choose from according to the pay-offs
and subjective probabilities. The policy makers may (or may not) attach subjective probabilities to
alternative sets of assumptions in order to derive their policy reaction. If the subjective
probabilities are not attached, it is not possible to find the optimal policy reaction since policy
makers need to calculate the expected pay-offs of all possible policy reactions in order to do so. In
our example, the expected pay-off of reducing interest rates is 2. The expected pay-off of leaving
the interest rates unchanged is 0.5 and the , the expected pay-off of increasing interest rates is -
1.5. Hence, the optimal policy reaction is to leave interest rates unchanged. The example
illustrates that the framework of the pay-off matrix allows policy makers to compare the outcomes
of possible policy reactions under all relevant alternative sets of assumptions. It is worth noting
that the incomplete pay-of matrix would have implied other conclusion. Specifically, if only one
set of neutral assumptions was used in order to avoid a necessity to attach subjective probabilities,
the option of increasing interest rates would be the most attractive.
Traces of decision analysis in research on monetary policy
Our suggestion to use more systematically the framework of the pay-off matrix during monetary
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monetary policy. In the previous chapter, we have already summarised the findings of two
research papers that have explicitly applied concepts and algorithms from DA in order to analyse
the implications of model uncertainty for monetary policy decisions. Cagliarini, Heath (2000) and
Tetlow R. J., von zur Muehlen P. (2000) debate about the suitable methods to overcome model
uncertainty and compare outcomes of using the minimax approach to outcomes of using the
inertia assumption. Cagliarini, Heath (2000) argue that the latter approach corresponds better to
the behaviour of central bankers, since in reality, they are more likely to consider all possible
probability distributions than to react with their interest rates according to the one model that
represents monetary policy as the least effective from all available models. This debate can be
transformed into the debate about decision rules that are used to select one alternative from the
pay-off matrix in the DA framework.
From the survey on methods used by central bankers to forecast important economic variables
presented in Sims (2002), one can conclude that a “mechanical” method based only on forecasting
with the core model is outperformed by a “combination” method based on using a suite of models
in a combination with expert forecasts and subjective judgements of monetary policy makers.
Sims (2002) emphasises that central bankers use more suitable methods than those used in
academic research to discuss monetary policy decisions under uncertainty since central bankers
have employed elements of the Bayesian decision theory, such as subjective probability
distributions. He illustrates that non-Bayesian methods, such as textbook econometrics or the
calibration of coefficients, used by the majority of the forecasting models are not adequate. He
gives examples of events that have to be included into monetary policy analysis but that cannot be
treated as drawn from statistical distributions, for example oil crises, data collection error or an
attack on a currency. Again, these conclusions are not very far from the DA findings that, as we
will see in next paragraphs, suggest using models to illustrate outcomes of potential alternatives,
using expert knowledge to specify all viable alternatives and leaving it to decision makers to
attach probabilities to these alternatives and to select a decision rule adequate for a specific
problem.
Monetary policy makers need to deal with uncertainty not only internally but also externally,
since they need to justify their decisions made under uncertainty to the general public. Wallis
(forthcoming) compares the various possibilities of how to report uncertainty, such as a forecast
interval, event probability, a histogram or density forecast. Similarly to the decision theory, he
views the problem of a decision maker in the case of certainty, where a decision maker can decide
optimally knowing the model and its loss function, very differently from the case of uncertainty,
where a decision maker needs to know all distributions related to the decision problem in order to
decide optimally. As a result, according to Wallis (forthcoming), monetary policy makers should
not rely exclusively on the point forecasts of important economic variables or on those
representations of uncertainty that do not provide full information about all distributions related to
decision problem. This is a strong argument for reporting the density forecasts for all economic
variables (not just inflation) that are crucial to monetary policy decisions. Similarly, DA findings
suggest that, without a complete pay-off matrix, it is not possible to apply all types of decision
rules. In addition, Wallis (forthcoming) also points out that it is important to evaluate the quality
of the forecast regularly, because this evaluation helps to improve the forecasting tools. This
proposition corresponds well to the weighing method proposed by DA for the case in which
parallel analytical tools are available. The method derives relative weights of alternative analytical
tools according to their track record of past successes.16  Kateřina Šmídková
Dealing with uncertainty in decision analysis
Since the majority of decisions are based on imperfect knowledge, the issue of decision-making
under uncertainty has been extensively addressed in the several branches of literature.
Specifically, probability theory and expected utility theory have been combined in decision
theory. The original elements of decision theory are mapped, for example, in Laplace (1795), von
Neumann, Morgenstern (1944) or Wald (1950). Decision theory itself has been applied in several
fields of economics, for example finance or game theory, as illustrated in Laffont (1989) or Reny
(1998). However, there is a specific discipline that focuses on applying decision theory to
decision-making in practice. DA can offer supporting tools that aim at improving the decision-
making process at various stages, such as problem identification, collecting and evaluating
information, and actual decision or sensitivity analysis. There are numerous DA textbooks that
explain all of the important concepts, for example Beroggi (1998) or Skinner (1999). The
techniques that DA can offer to decision makers include pay-off matrices, decision rules, decision
trees, dynamic programming, cost-benefit analysis, Bayesian methods, and Monte Carlo
simulations.
Central banks targeting inflation have already overcome all the major obstacles of the earlier
stages of the decision process. The decision problem has been clearly identified with
announcements of explicit inflation targets, granting independence to central banks and with their
subsequent effort to be highly transparent and accountable. Also, the tools for collecting and
evaluating information available to monetary policy makers are already extensive. It is worth
focusing more on the decision stage and on the subsequent stages of the decision process.
According to DA, policy makers are in a decision situation if there are at least two possible
reactions available to them. The decision is produced after the outcomes of all possible reactions
are evaluated and compared with respect to the final goal and various uncertainties faced by
policy makers. In this context, a “good” decision offers the best chance of success to meet the
final goal in the time of the decision. As a consequence, a good decision does not guarantee a
good outcome, because there is uncertainty. This definition of a “good” decision implies that a
decision should be based on evaluation of the broader context of a problem, including the risks
and uncertainties related to applied analytical tools
Inflation targeting central banks do not have any problems when listing all the possible reactions,
since they can either to reduce policy interest rates, leave them unchanged or increase them.
Central banks usually develop a very good core model to be used for forecasting inflation and
other key economic variables. Hence, evaluation of the outcomes of these possible policy
reactions in some well-defined analytical framework is possible. In this framework, it is usually
also possible to deal with the risks attached to the central forecast, for example, by assuming that
shocks in the core model have normal distributions and then by using stochastic simulations. It is
much more difficult to develop a methodology for dealing with Knightian uncertainties. For this
stage of the decision-making process, DA textbooks recommend detecting which assumptions of
the analytical framework are the most influential, for example, by running sensitivity tests, and
which assumptions are most uncertain, for example, by regular ex post analysis of forecasting
tools, regular review of the reliability of data sources, or by attaching subjective probabilities to
various assumptions. Then several alternative situations can be specified, for which the evaluation
of outcomes of all (three) possible policy reactions will be conducted. This methodology should
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forecast assumptions, are illustrated not within the central forecast but with alternative
simulations. As a result, policy makers will have a pay-off matrix before them, explicitly or
implicitly, that compares the outcomes of possible policy reactions under several alternative sets
of assumptions and will be ready to make their decision. As we will see in the next chapter,
several inflation targeting central banks have selected subjective probabilities as a method of
dealing with Knightian uncertainties, and publish fan charts to communicate with the general
public. It is interesting to note that, in comparison to DA recommendations, fan charts are not
reported for all three possible policy reactions.
The pay-off matrix and decision rules
As was said, we propose to follow the logic of the pay-off matrix during the monetary policy
decision process in order to deal adequately with uncertainty. Table 2 illustrated the proposed
methodology. Although the framework looks simple, the difficulty of the decision process is
reflected in the fact that the elements of the pay-off matrix are not always easily identified. Firstly,
the evaluation of the pay-offs need not be defined as the distance of the expected inflation from
the target. Depending on the actual implementation of the inflation targeting strategy, the pay-off
can be equal to the cumulated differences between the forecasted inflation and the target for a
certain period. If both the target and the forecast are announced in the form of an interval, the
event probability, as suggested in Wallis (forthcoming), can be used to evaluate the pay-offs. In
addition, the pay-offs can be constructed analogously to the loss function, and certain weights can
be attached to other factors such as output gaps of interest rate volatility. Alternatively, policy
makers can choose to work with a less formal, for example graphical, representation of the pay-
offs.
Secondly, it is not easy to identify ex ante all the major weaknesses of the set of assumptions that
corresponds to the central forecast and that we called a “neutral” set. Hence, the columns of the
pay off-matrix are more difficult to construct than the rows, since the three basic possible
reactions of monetary policy makers – to increase or decrease interest rates or to leave them
unchanged – are ex ante well known. This decision on which columns the pay-off matrix should
have is difficult – though often implicit because it cannot count on a methodology as elaborate as
the one used to produce the central forecast. Monetary policy makers can be uncertain about some
parts of the model – the paths of exogenous variables, future shocks or the model itself – and they
can be uncertain about different factors in different times. However, decisions about interest rates
must be taken in real time, and so policy makers do not want to debate every small uncertainty
separately. In other words, they do not want to work with a pay-off matrix that has too many
columns. Hence, they use their judgment and intuition to select the most influential factors that
are uncertain and to analyse the consequences of several sets of alternative assumptions (each of
which may group several uncertainties together) for the central forecast. Although there are
methods available to provide input information for decisions about the columns of the pay-off
matrix, such as sensitivity analysis or impulse response functions, this stage of the monetary
policy decision process relies enormously on the intuition of individual policy makers.
Thirdly, it was said that the rows of the pay-off matrix are more straightforward to construct than
the columns. In this context, it is worth noting that if the core model works with a policy rule
instead of a fixed-rate assumption, the three basic possible policy reactions cannot be represented
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important for policy makers – according to DA findings – to have the option of comparing the
outcomes of all the possible actions they consider during their policy meeting. This implies that
the core model with endogenous monetary policy should offer at least three possible reaction
functions that would produce ceteris paribus three different paths of policy interest rates. These
three paths should correspond to the three basic policy options mentioned earlier. In this
modelling set-up, the rows of the pay-off matrix would correspond to switching between three
possible policy rules, for example the baseline policy rule and more cautious and more aggressive
rules. Otherwise, the framework of the pay-off matrix would remain equivalent to the one
described in Table 2.
Finally, after the pay-off matrix is completed, policy makers are able to use it to find the best
reaction. DA offers various decision rules to determine which reaction from the possibilities
represented as the rows of the pay-off matrix is the best one. Let us illustrate the problem of
selecting the appropriate decision rule. Policy makers can, for example, compare the alternative
sets of assumptions before the central forecast is produced and select the set that is the most
probable. Let us say that the neutral set is the most likely. Then policy makers only need to
compare the pay-offs of the three possible reactions under the neutral set of assumptions and
select the policy reaction with the best pay-off. Table 3 illustrates that this decision strategy
results in increasing policy interest rates in our example from Table 2. In DA, this decision rule is
called the rule of the best of the most probable. It is also called the optimist’s rule, because it
neglects the other sets of assumptions that both have non-zero probability.












The most likely assumptions
On the one hand, the rule of the best of the most probable saves on the costs of evaluating the pay-
offs for the whole matrix. On the other hand, if the uncertainties are high, the application of this
rule can lead to a sub-optimal decision. In this case, policy makers may prefer to invest more and
construct the whole pay-off matrix. Not only will they work out nine forecasts in order to evaluate
the pay-offs, they will also attach subjective probabilities to the three alternative sets of
assumptions. Then policy makers will derive the expected pay-off values for each of the three
possible policy reactions and select the policy reaction with the best expected pay-off. Table 4
shows that this decision strategy will lead to unchanged policy interest rates. In DA, this decision
rule is called the rule of the best expected value and is often referred to as the rational rule. It is
worth noting that if policy makers do not attach subjective probabilities to all the alternative sets
of assumptions or do not fill the whole pay-off matrix, they can use the rational rule for their
decisions.Targeting inflation under uncertainty: Policy makers’ perspective   19
Table 4: Pay-off matrix: “The best expected value” rule













Reduce rates 035 2
No change -1 1 4 0.5
Increase rates -5 0.5 2.5 -1.5
As illustrated in DA textbooks, the outcome of the decision process will always depend on the
decision rule selected. There are many ways of deciding which policy reaction is the best. Some
decision rules, such as the “best of the most probable”, require attaching probabilities to the
alternative sets of assumptions. Some decision rules, such as “maximin”, do not require this. One
of the decision rules in the latter category has been used, as was said, in Tetlow R. J., von zur
Muehlen P. (2000). It is worth noting that the decision rules in the first category work with the
mathematical concept of expected values, and so alternative sets of assumptions that yield very
high pay-offs or that are very likely to will be considered more during the actual decision. For
these rules, it is important to have prepared a clear methodology for attaching subjective
probabilities to the alternative sets of assumptions. They are called subjective because in the case
of important assumptions, decision makers often do not have enough historical information to
calculate mathematical distributions, and consequently they have to make their best educated
guesses about them. Table 5 illustrates which policy reaction has been selected by various
decision rules in our example from Table 2. It is worth noting that – depending on the decision
rule selected – it is possible to reach three different conclusions about the “good” policy response
with the same central forecast. For example, the Laplace rule suggests increasing interest rates.
The rule working with the best of the expected values suggests leaving rates unchanged. The rule
based on the principle of the “best of the most probable” suggests increasing interest rates. More
detailed information about the algorithms behind the decision rules is provided in Appendix III.20  Kateřina Šmídková
Table 5: Outcome of the alternative decision rules
Decision Rule Description Outcome
Alternative Sets of Assumptions without Probability
Laplace Each alternative situation equally probable
Select the reaction with the best pay-off
Increase in
interest rates
Maximin Find the worst pay-off for each reaction
Select the reaction with the minimal worst pay-off
No change
Maximax Find the best pay-off for each reaction
Select the reaction with the best of best pay-off
Reduction in
interest rates
Minimum regret Construct a regret matrix
Select the reaction with the smallest regret
No change
Probabilities of Alternative Sets of Assumptions Are Needed
Best expected value Attach probabilities for alternative situations
Select the reaction with the best expected pay-off
No change
Best of the most
probable
Find the most likely alternative situation
Select the reaction that produces the best pay-off
Increase in
interest rates
Note: See Appendix III for illustrative calculations of outcomes under the individual decision rules.
Lessons for inflation targeting from decision analysis
DA analysis offers analytical tools for combining various types of information important for
monetary policy decisions. Specifically, the structure of the pay-off matrix illustrates well that the
central forecast obtained with the core forecasting model is not enough to decide whether the
assumed path of policy interest rates is optimal. In our example, the forecasting exercise that
produced the central forecast filled in only one ninth of the pay-off matrix. The remaining 88
percent of information necessary for a decision on policy interest rates came from debating
alternative sets of assumptions, attaching subjective probabilities to them, and comparing the
outcomes of all possible policy reactions under all alternative sets of assumptions. It is worth
noting that, unless there is perfect model certainty, this conclusion is true even if the forecasting
model is stochastic. Monetary policy makers may not employ the pay-off matrix as a formal
analytical tool when deciding about policy interest rates, but in order to make monetary policy
decisions, they informally combine all types of information present in the pay-off matrix, such as
a model forecast, off-model information or a subjective judgement. As was mentioned, this is well
documented, for example, in Blinder (1998), Budd (1998), Freedman (1999), Issing (1999) or
Sims (2002).
To conclude, according to DA, it is a very significant simplification to represent decisions of an
inflation targeting central bank with a forward-looking rule based on the point inflation forecast,
as illustrated, for example, in Svensson (1996), or with simple policy rules as illustrated, for
example, in Taylor (1993). These representations are very useful when the central forecast is
produced, but should not be used as a substitute for monetary policy decisions. This does not
imply that there will not be periods of time when policy rules do not predict monetary policy
decisions well. If policy makers face ex ante very low Knightian uncertainty, their (implicit) pay-
off matrix can be reduced to one element containing the central forecast. However, under less
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than other types of information, including which decision rule is mimicked by the institutional
settings in the central bank.
The decision rule is an important part of the decision-making process. Table 5 documented that,
given the pay-off matrix, each of the three possible policy reactions can be the best reaction
depending on which rule has been used for the decision. Consequently, it is important for
monetary policy makers to try to coordinate their decisions with a decision rule that is adequate to
their situation. Specifically, if it is feasible, the probabilities of alternative sets of assumptions
should be attached so that the rule of the highest expected value can be followed. There are
several methods for attaching probabilities to alternative sets of assumptions. It is worth recalling
that these probabilities are subjective since they cannot be estimated for various reasons (e.g. due
to Knightian uncertainty). Policy makers can attach subjective probabilities verbally during an
informal discussion, or they can vote anonymously in order to create distribution with votes. Both
approaches are observed in the case studies, as we will see in the next chapter. If – for some
reason – it is necessary to compare the outcomes of alternative sets of assumptions without
expressing their probabilities, then it is preferable to decide according to the minimum regret rule,
which is more cautious than, for example, the maximin rule. The maximin rule is more suitable
for spheres of decision-making (e.g. defence) in which leaders need to prevent at all costs the
largest possible damage.
The last lesson to learn from DA is that it is very important to invest considerable analytical effort
into creating what we can call a “map of uncertainties”, since the specified alternative sets of
assumptions need to illustrate well the major uncertainties faced by monetary policy makers.
There is no easy method available showing how this should be done. As a rule of thumb, given
the structure of the forecasting model, all very influential elements of the model, such as
coefficients, variables or shocks, as well as all major concerns related to the model itself, should
be on the map together with very likely dramatic changes in exogenous variables. The influence
of the various parts of the model can be judged with the help of various analytical tools such as
impulse response functions or variance decompositions. It is then possible to group all
uncertainties on the map into several sets and attach probabilities to these sets, as we did in our
example. For the sake of simplicity, it is possible to use deliberately only two sets of assumptions
that can be called “favourable” and “cautious”, as illustrated in Wallis (forthcoming).
Alternatively, the “envelope” subjective probability distribution can be derived around the central
forecast. In this case, the implicit pay-off matrix will have, in fact, an infinite number of columns.
4. How inflation targeters deal with uncertainty
Short case studies on dealing with uncertainty
The subject of five short case studies has been to document how inflation targeting central banks
deal with uncertainty. Specifically, we wanted to learn which information pillars are used for
monetary policy decision under uncertainty. Our working hypothesis was that most central banks
targeting inflation would need at least two information pillars, as was suggested in Šmídková
(1999). Firstly, the core forecasting model or a suite of models is used in order to produce the
central inflation forecast. It is worth noting that deciding whether the core model should be22  Kateřina Šmídková
calibrated or estimated has further implications for the methodology of dealing with uncertainty.
Secondly, a methodology for processing all off-model information, including subjective
judgements of policy makers, is needed. This second pillar is added on to the central forecast in
order to facilitate decisions on policy interest rates and to produce the final inflation forecasts
presented to the general public. The second information pillar can have various forms such as a
verbal description of risks, alternative policy simulations produced by the core forecasting model
or a subjective probability distribution for a fan chart. Some of these forms have methods of
dealing with uncertainty already built-in. Various procedures can be employed to select which
risks or uncertainties should be analysed in a specific time period.
The following case studies are described in chronological order according to the year in which the
respective central banks have started targeting inflation: the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the
Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Swedish Riksbank and then the Czech National Bank.
Only publicly available sources have been used to produce the case studies. A general overview of
the early experience with inflation targeting can be found in Haldane (1995) and an overview of
the experience of the first decade in Mishkin, Schmitt-Hebbel (2001). A comparison of the
forecasting methodology of central banks has been presented, for example, in Sims (2002) or
Pagan (2002). Comments on how central banks have exchanged modelling know-how can be
found in Poloz, Rose, Tetlow (1994) and Amano, Coletti, Macklem (1999). Additional country-
specific information has been obtained from Inflation Reports, Monetary Policy Statements or
Monetary Policy Reports and research and policy papers published by the five central banks, see
Blix, Sellin (1999), Britton, Fisher, Whitley (1998), Hrnčíř, Šmídková (2001), Macklem (2002),
RBNZ (2000) and Vickers (1998).
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand started targeting inflation in 1990, and Monetary policy
statements have been published since that time. Economic projections are presented to the general
public in the form of graphs that show the paths for inflation, output and other variables - such as
exports - produced by the central projection for a three-year horizon. In addition, a graph with a
projected path for 90-day interest rates is also published, but only one quarter in advance. It has
been stressed that the inflation forecast is not a policy projection as in the cases of other central
banks, because monetary policy is endogenous in the forecasting model in order to approximate
the strategy of inflation forecast targeting as closely as possible. Uncertainties and risks related to
the central projection and decisions on interest rates are described verbally. The central economic
projection and a description of risks and uncertainties correspond to the Governor’s decision. The
MPC has only an advisory role, and the minutes from the monetary meetings are not published.
The internal policy debate has three stages. The first stage is focused on broadening the policy
debate. Important issues that should be discussed during the policy debate are identified. In order
to capture the whole range of feasible policy options and to ensure that the policy debate is robust,
selected MPC members are asked to prepare brief notes advocating a “hawkish” and “dovish”
policy stance. The second stage consists of a presentation of the central projection with a
sensitivity analysis and risk scenarios requested by the MPC. The forecasting model FPS is
similar to the Canadian QPM in its structure. It is calibrated and works with the reaction function.
Alternative reaction functions that are slower or faster than the benchmark reaction function are
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part as well as in the long-run equilibria – to correspond better to new data or other off-model
information. In the third stage, the debate is narrowed in order to reach conclusions, and the
policy statement is drafted. The central projection plays a key role in the policy debate, but it is
not the only factor affecting policy decisions.
The Bank of Canada
The Bank of Canada started targeting inflation in 1991, and monetary policy reports have been
published since 1995. The inflation projection presented to the general public takes the form of a
one-year point estimate with an accompanying verbal description of the general economic
outlook, including the risks of the projection. The economic projection is produced as the most
likely path for the economy. Although the projection is based on the model working with
monetary policy rules, it is not called a forecast in order to emphasise that the point estimate of
future inflation is conditional on various assumptions. In comparison to the Bank of England or
the Riksbank, the Bank of Canada communicates about uncertainty in a much less formal way
using a verbal description of important risks and their potential impact on the inflation outlook
and a verbal description of alternative scenarios. It is often emphasised that a multiple-model
approach has been taken in order to overcome model uncertainty.
The internal process starts with the staff producing an economic projection that will be the
reference points for further steps of the decision-making process. Although a suite of models is
used, there is a core model for medium-term projections (QPM) that has been calibrated. The core
model combines three parts: a steady-state model, a dynamic part, and expert input reflected in
residuals. In the second step, the main risks are then selected by the Council, partly reflecting the
staff’s suggestions, and alternative scenarios are specified for alternative simulations. In addition
to risk analyses, alternative policy scenarios are also considered and represented with alternative
policy rules. As a result, the Council is presented with a range of projections and a range of policy
simulations that can be compared to the reference projection. Then all projections and policy
simulations and additional off-model information are discussed during the meeting where
directors and experts can recommend a particular policy reaction. Finally, the Council meets to
decide on an appropriate policy reaction, which must be consensual.
The Bank of England
The Bank of England started targeting inflation in 1992, and Inflation reports have been published
since that time. The Minutes of the MPC meeting are published with the names of the MPC
members and their specific votes. Economic projections presented to the general public have the
form of two-year fan charts for inflation and output growth. Fan charts are constructed around the
central projection. The central projection corresponds to the mode of a subjective probability
distribution that reflects the MPC subjective assessments of risks. However, the whole content of
the Inflation reports is important since the official documents often stress that decisions on interest
rates are based on a broader set of information than the one used for the construction of fan charts,
and that monetary policy is not automatically derived solely from fan charts. While the core
model works with 150 variables, information discussed on the pre-MPC briefing typically consists
of 500 charts and tables and 1000 variables. Fan charts are attributed two roles. Internally, their
creation facilitates monetary policy debates. Externally, they help to communicate monetary24  Kateřina Šmídková
policy bias through the difference between mode and median and- through the subjective
distribution variance - to illustrate the degree of uncertainty faced by policy makers.
The Bank of England organises several rounds of meetings in order to produce the final
projection. In the first step, the suite of models is used to produce the draft projection. The core
model has around twenty equations, and it is estimated. The projections are run under the fixed
interest rate assumption, and residual adjustments are made when necessary to correspond better
to expert views or off-model information. Sometimes, alternative projections are prepared
conditioned on the higher and lower values of interest rates. In the subsequent rounds, the draft
projection, off-model information and assessments of risks are discussed using both “bottom up”
and “top down” approaches in order to ensure that the final version represents the MPC views.
After individual risks are evaluated by the MPC and the staff, they are aggregated to give the
overall balance of risks that is then used to produce fan charts. As a starting point, historical
distributions of exogenous variables and equation error terms are taken, but the final version
represents a subjective assessment of risks. The final projection is not interpreted as the most
likely path for inflation, because not all information has been included in the draft projection and
subsequent risk assessment and because the projection is conditional.
The Swedish Riksbank
The Swedish Riksbank started targeting inflation in 1993, and Inflation reports have been
published since that time. The Riksbank also publishes Minutes of the monetary policy meetings.
Inflation projections in the form of a two-year fan chart have been a part of the inflation reports
since 1997. The Riksbank communicates about uncertainty related to monetary policy with the
help of the main scenario and a verbal description of the risk spectrum around the main scenario.
The fan chart probability distribution and the table with percentage probability of different
outcomes illustrate the risk spectrum graphically. The main scenario has been defined as the most
likely inflation path, because this definition avoids any impact of extreme events on the decision
even though the Riksbank is aware that there is a disadvantage with this choice since the whole
distribution is not considered. The risk spectrum need not be symmetrical due to the introduction
of skewness of the composed probability distribution. For example, there is a downside risk if the
inflation forecast is more likely to overestimate future inflation.
Internally, the main scenario and the risk spectrum are created in several steps. The “bottom-up”
process is used, and the main scenario and risks are mostly prepared by experts. If the Board
disagrees with the outcome of the process, the main scenario or inflation forecast distribution can
be adjusted. The main scenario of the inflation projection is based on the model forecast obtained
from a suite of models. The core forecasting model is similar to the Canadian QPM but it is run
under the fixed-rate assumption. Then uncertainty intervals for important inflation factors are
constructed. The assessments of risk factors are subjective because the stochastic approach would
not allow several models, off-model information and subjective judgments on future risks to be
considered. Finally, the inflation forecast distribution is composed of the uncertainty intervals
with a methodology that has been developed especially for this purpose by the Riksbank. The
weights of individual factors for aggregation of distributions are derived from the underlying
forecasting model. The methodology is similar to that of the Bank of England – for example, it
uses a two-piece normal distribution – but it works with uncertainty intervals differently.Targeting inflation under uncertainty: Policy makers’ perspective   25
The Czech National Bank
The CNB started targeting inflation in 1998, and Inflation Reports have been published since that
time. The CNB publishes Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meetings that include the voting pattern
without names if the Board members. Inflation projections take the form of a chart representing
the inflation outlook for the whole horizon of monetary policy transmission, approximated to be
eighteen months. In order to illustrate the scope of uncertainty about the central forecast, the
bands are attached to it, and the chart represents the band forecast. As a result, the public can
compare the inflation target with the inflation forecast on one chart, both in the form of a band.
The projection of GDP growth is published as an interval forecast for the end of the year. The
forecast is unconditional with respect to interest rates, and their future path, consistent with the
forecast for the forthcoming twelve-month horizon, is verbally indicated on the press conference.
Risks and uncertainties are assessed verbally in the Inflation report. In addition, important
exogenous assumptions of the central forecast, such as development of import prices or external
demand, are explicitly published in order to emphasise that if external conditions change, the path
of policy interest rates will be different from the one indicated by the forecast.
The internal process of forecasting inflation has several stages. Initially, the Board meets with a
group of directors, advisers and experts in order to discuss the initial assumptions of the forecast.
Attention is paid to model assumptions as well as to the forecasts of external variables, and
several alternative scenarios are specified. Then the central forecast emerges from the interaction
of the core model with expert inputs. The structure of the model is similar to that of the RBNZ. It
consists of long-run and dynamic parts, and endogenous monetary policy. The Czech version of
the model does not include stock variables nor does it include a representation of fiscal policy.
The methodology of producing the forecast is similar to that used by the RBNZ. The assumptions
as well as residuals are adjusted in order to produce forecast that would be in line with the expert
views. In the next stage, the central forecast and outcomes of alternative policy simulations are
presented to the Board and the group of directors, advisers and experts, who can then require
further adjustments or to suggest leaving out specific alternative policy simulations. After this
meeting, the Inflation report is drafted. For the purpose of Inflation report, the bands, whose
widths are calibrated in a relatively simple way, are attached to the central forecast in order to
illustrate the risks. During the policy meeting, the new forecast is presented. Afterwards, the
Board discusses the forecast and votes on policy decision in a closed meeting, and one of the
advisers records the Minutes. The Minutes focus on describing the reasons behind the decision
and on illustrating the uncertainties related to the forecast. The votes of the Board members are
independent, it is not necessary to reach a consensus. If no consensus is reached, the voting
pattern is published in order to give additional information about uncertainty to the general public.
Several findings from the five case studies
According to publicly available sources, the central banks targeting inflation do not seem to be
strict inflation forecast targeters. Inflation forecasts have two important roles for central banks.
Internally, they provide a framework for policy discussion. They help to structure the decision
process and ensure its consistency. Externally, inflation forecasts are communication tools that
illustrate reasons for the decision and the uncertainty faced by policy makers. However, other
communication tools are used as well. Specifically, central banks include verbally described risk
profiles in their Inflation reports or publish minutes of their policy meetings with the voting26  Kateřina Šmídková
pattern. All five central banks emphasise that they work with the whole range of information
when deciding about policy interest rates: the suite of models, off-model forecasts by experts,
other off-model information, preliminary voting by a group of advisers, and the subjective
judgment of the board members. These findings are in line with our working hypothesis that most
central banks targeting inflation need at least two information pillars. While the methodology for
producing the first pillar – the central forecast – has been extensively covered by literature, the
methodology for composing the second pillar - that should evaluate uncertainty attached to the
central forecast - from various information sources certainly deserves more attention.
The central projection represents in all five cases the most likely trajectory of the economy,
conditioned by the information available at the time of the policy decision. In the cases of central
banks that subsequently use asymmetric distribution of risks, this explicitly implies that the
central forecast is not the mean or the median of the possible trajectories. At the same time, all
five central banks declare that, although the central forecast is the most visible part of the
information presented to the general public, it need not be a decisive piece of information. This
brings us back to the second information pillar. In addition to the central forecast, off-model
information is analysed as well, such as financial sector development. Then the whole distribution
of risks is considered during policy debate. However, this distribution is not necessarily
symmetric. The evidence suggests that it is rather the expected trajectory of the economy derived
from the subjective probability distributions that form the final outcome of the decision process
than the model forecast itself. It is important to understand that subjective probability distributions
are a broader concept than the distributions used for the construction of fan charts. Specifically,
they are formed by the board members with the help of managerial methods, such as confronting
two opposite views (e.g. “hawkish” and “dovish” stance), preliminary indicative voting in a group
of experts or the requirement to reach consensus within the Board.
The second information pillar is always represented in Inflation or Policy reports for the benefit of
the general public. However, the way of representing it is not as straightforward as in the case of
the central forecast. Even the two central banks that illustrate the scope of uncertainty and bias of
the monetary policy stance with fan charts use additional tools, such as a verbal description of the
risk profile or minutes of the meeting with a voting pattern. Fan charts are aggregating subjective
assessments of the board members and experts of important uncertainties. The weights of various
risk factors usually correspond to their impact on inflation in the core forecasting model. Several
banks use alternative scenarios to communicate their uncertainty about important external factors
such as commodity prices. One bank calculates bands around the central inflation forecast without
attaching the probability distributions to the interval forecast and verbally communicates when the
outcome is more likely to be close to one of the bands than to the central point of the interval. To
sum up, due to the complexity of the decision-making process, it is very difficult to represent the
whole content of the second information pillar with only one communication tool, and hence, it is
not possible for the external observer to easily reconstruct the subjective probability distribution
built around the central forecast.
There are several sources of uncertainties that are prominent in policy debates of inflation
targeting central banks. Specifications of the long-run equilibrium exchange rate and estimates of
potential output are two important sources of model uncertainty. It is worth noting that they are
important in our case studies, because four out of five central banks follow the Canadian
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long-run part of the model, and the results depend heavily on the values of the output gap. On the
other hand, errors in estimates are not a matter of great concern, because the Canadian school
prefers calibrated models. All five central banks conduct monetary policy in open economies.
Consequently, one of the stages of the forecasting process is usually fully devoted to forecasting
external variables and evaluating the quality of alternative sources of forecasts for the world
economy. In addition, specific attention is paid to financial markets and their impact on the
exchange rate. All three central banks that use endogenous monetary policy in their models
produce alternative policy simulations for different values of risk premium.
5. Conclusions
It is important for monetary policy makers to work with the both information pillars during the
decision process. A high-quality central projection of economic development without a careful
evaluation of uncertainties does not guarantee that a good decision will be taken regarding the
level of policy interest rates. Hence, similar attention should be paid to developing a forecasting
framework as well as a methodology for dealing with uncertainty. The second information pillar
representing the assessment of uncertainties should not be neglected during monetary policy
decisions especially when:
  there is Knightian uncertainty related to the forecasting model, for example,
specification of the influential equation is problematic,
  there is Knightian uncertainty related to some assumption of the central projection,
for example, the probability distribution of the future values of important
exogenous variable is unknown,
  there are signals that risks around the central forecast are not distributed
symmetrically, for example, off-model information or new data may change the
balance of risks.
Under these conditions, monetary policy decisions that are based solely on the central forecast,
even if the forecast is the outcome of stochastic simulations, are likely to depart from the optimal
policy reaction. Since it is usually difficult to judge ex ante whether one of these conditions is
fulfilled, monetary policy makers should use general methods developed for all decision makers
dealing with uncertainty rather than be strict “inflation forecast targeters”. However, it should be
noted that monetary policy makers targeting inflation do have a considerable advantage over
decision makers in other spheres due to the well-defined framework, provided by the inflation
targeting strategy, that makes evaluation of the outcomes of possible policy reactions under
alternative sets of assumptions straightforward.
While literature on monetary policy under uncertainty has developed an excellent background
necessary for building the first information pillar, the question of how to build the second pillar
has not yet received a sufficient amount of attention. We suggest working with the pay-off matrix
as a suitable methodology for dealing with uncertainty during the monetary decision process. As
was confirmed by the five case studies, this tool, which has been developed within the context of
DA literature, is used by central banks in real-life situations, however informal or implicit it may
be. DA tools are also referred to in literature on monetary policy under uncertainty, though the
pay-off matrix is not explicitly quoted. We do not recommend using the matrix in a formal,
mathematically rigorous manner that would require calculating the exact value of each element of28  Kateřina Šmídková
the pay-off matrix. Rather we find it useful to think in the logic of the pay-off matrix and pay
equal attention to all its components when making monetary-policy decisions and when
communicating with the general public.
Table 6 presents the alternative methods that are referred to by the literature or are used by central
banks to develop the pay-off matrix from the individual components. The components represent
various stages of the monetary-policy decision process. While the methodology of producing the
central forecast has already been developed in the CNB, examples of methodologies applied at
subsequent stages of the decision process may provide interesting inspiration to the CNB. For
example, the core model could be used to produce on a quarterly basis five projections that would
illustrate the implications of using three variants of the reaction function (baseline, faster, slower)
for the neutral set of assumptions and the implications of two alternative sets of assumptions
(deflation risks, inflation risks) under the baseline reaction function. The remaining four corner
elements of the pay-off matrix would be commented on only verbally, if needed. Then expert
judgement or preliminary voting of a group of experts could be systematically used to attach
subjective probabilities to three alternative sets of assumptions. The pay-off could be initially
represented with inflation and output growth forecast charts, then when the stochastic forecasting
model is available, the pay-offs could correspond to the probability that inflation will be inside the
targeted range. As shown in Table 6, there are other alternatives feasible for each stage of the
decision process, and their advantages or disadvantages should be subject to further debate.
We suggest that using a framework corresponding to the pay-off matrix has two advantages.
Firstly, the pay-off matrix organises very different types of information that is important for
monetary policy decisions into one framework. The outcomes of model simulations, such as the
central projection or policy simulations, are combined with more subjective inputs, such as
specifications of the alternative sets of assumptions or probabilities attached to them. During the
process of combining these inputs, the previously mentioned problems with uncertainty are taken
care off. Alternative sets of assumptions can illustrate key uncertainties without restricting the
assumptions of the linear forecasting model or standard stochastic shocks. Subjective probabilities
can define asymmetric distributions around the central forecast and evaluate the potential impact
of asymmetric risks on the expected values. This is a very important advantage when monetary
policy makers wish to use an analogy to the “rational” decision rule due to large asymmetry in
probabilities attached to the alternative sets of assumptions, for example, with deflation being
considered a serious threat. In this case, policy makers need to select from possible policy
reactions the one with the best expected pay-off. If probabilities attached to the alternative sets of
assumptions do not produce large asymmetries with respect to the central case, policy makers may
wish to apply the “optimist’s” decision rule. In this case, they select the policy reaction that
guarantees the best pay-off under the most likely set of assumptions. The framework
corresponding to the pay-off matrix can easily accommodate both cases.
Secondly, the structure of the pay-off matrix provides a very good background for communicating
the decision to the general public. Various communication tools used by central banks can be
viewed as a subset of information organised in the pay-off matrix. For example, the central
forecast represents one element of the pay-off matrix. The subjective probabilities attached to
alternative sets of assumptions can be illustrated with the voting pattern of the board members if it
is a part of the publicly available minutes of the meeting. The fan chart corresponds to one row of
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probabilities attached to alternative sets of assumptions. Similarly, comments on implications of
the interaction of the forecasting model with different policy rules reveal information found in one
column of the pay-off matrix. The more the implicit pay-off matrix is revealed to the general
public in a consistent, well-organised way, the higher the transparency of the monetary policy
decisions is. External communication explaining all key inputs of monetary policy decisions that
are represented by various parts of the pay-off matrix convinces the general public more easily
that much more is needed to generate good decisions than producing the central forecast, and that
monetary policy decisions must not be a mechanical response to the point forecasts. As a result,
the public will not expect – as it is often the case – interest rates to change only if the forecast
changes. It will follow that even if input represented by elements of the pay-off matrix is not
revised, new probabilities attached to alternative sets of assumptions will change the optimal
monetary policy stance.30  Kateřina Šmídková
Table 6: Alternative Methods for Developing a Pay-Off Matrix
Method Description Examples
Benchmark Case
Model forecast Theory-based model, parameters calibrated
Monetary policy endogenous (reaction function)
BoC, RBNZ,
CNB
Halfway Theory-based model, parameters calibrated
Interest rates fixed (before or after decision)
SR, DA
Model projection Model based on weak theory, parameters estimated
Interest rates fixed (before or after decision)
BoE, DA
Possible Policy Reactions
Interest rates Consequences of possible reactions considered (e.g.
interest rate increase, no change, decrease)
DA, BoE*
Reaction functions Consequences of possible reactions considered (e.g.
interest rate increase, no change, decrease)
DA, BoC*,
RBNZ*
Alternative Sets of Assumptions
Two extreme sets Two sets of assumptions are specified “hawkish” and
“dovish”, central forecast is not emphasised
RBNZ*, KW
Benchmark +2 Three sets of assumptions are specified for central forecast
and surrounding bands
CNB*
Several alternatives Several alternative sets of assumptions specified,
Central forecast is not emphasised
DA, CNB*
Benchmark + + Several alternative sets of assumptions specified with
respect to central forecast
DA, BoC,
 RBNZ*





Not attached Alternative sets do not have attached probabilities.
Decision rules are used that do not require them.
DA




Preliminary voting Experts vote and distribution of votes defines probabilities





Probabilities attached verbally. Central forecast is the most
likely. Risks have no probability attached.
All five CBs





Implicit Various tables or charts illustrate divergence of inflation
from target under specific conditions
All five CBs*
Strict targeting Each element of the matrix contains single number (e.g.
deviation of projection from target)
DA
Event probability Elements of the matrix contain probabilities of inflation
being inside targeted range
KW
Decision
Governor Governor decides, no explicit voting RBNZ
Voting by members Board decides by voting, votes are independent BoE, CNB
Consensus method Board needs to reach consensus, no explicit voting BoC
Decision rule Decision rule is applied, outcome depends on rule DA
Note: Abbreviations: BoE – Bank of England, BoC – Bank of Canada, CB – central banks, CNB –Czech
National Bank, DA – decision analysis, KW – Wallis (forthcoming), RBNZ – Reserve Bank of New
Zealand, SR – Swedish Riksbank.
*) In this case, the method has not been applied to the full extent (e.g. applied in combination with
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Appendix I – Example of the Quadratic-Linear Framework
The Basic Model and the Certainty Benchmark
Srour (1999) describes the following baseline model for the closed economy:
(1a) t+1=t+d.(yt-y*)
(2a) yt+1-y*=b.(yt-y*)-c.(rt-r*)
where t is the inflation rate, yt is the aggregate output (in logs), y* is the potential output (in
logs), is rt is the real interest rate and r* is the average real interest rare.
In this type of models, the economy is represented with the two linear equations - the Phillips
curve and IS curve. The central bank is represented with the quadratic loss function:
(3) L(, y) = ( yt-y*)
2+(1-)(-*)
2
where * is the inflation target and  represent the weight attached to the output gap. If  is equal
to zero, the central bank in the model is a strict inflation targeter.
The expected value of the loss function is minimised. Then the optimal policy rule takes the
following form:
(4a) rt-r*=(1+b)/c.(yt-y*)+1/(c.d).( t-*).
Since there is a full certainty about the model of the economy, this case is called a certainty
benchmark. In other cases that are usually compared to the benchmark case some parts of the
baseline model are uncertain. The uncertainty is represented with white noise shocks.
The Case of Linear Uncertainty
In this case, the uncertainty takes a linear form. For example, normally distributed additive shocks
are introduced into both equations:
(1b) t+1=t+d.(yt-y*)+t+1
(2b) yt+1-y*=b.(yt-y*)-c.(rt-r*)+t+1
where t  and  t are white noise shocks.
Due to the nature of the shocks, the optimal policy rule is the same as in the baseline case:
(4b) rt-r*=(1+b)/c.(yt-y*)+1/(c.d).( t-*).
The Case of Non-linear Uncertainty
In this case, the uncertainty takes a non-linear form. For example, as explained in Srour (1999),
parameters of IS curve are uncertain:
(1b) t+1=t+d.(yt-y*)+t+1
(2b) yt+1-y*=b.(yt-y*)-c t+1.(rt-r*)+t+1
where  ct  is the white noise shock.
Since the uncertainties now combine in a non-linear manner, the optimal policy rule is different
from the baseline case:
(4c) rt-r*=(1+b)/(c.Sc).(yt-y*)+1/(c.Sc.d).( t-*)
where Sc is the ratio of the standard deviation of the shock ct to its mean.
In this specific case, interest rates will move less due uncertain elasticity of demand to real
interest rates.32  Kateřina Šmídková
Appendix II – Basic Terminology Used by Decision Analysis
Bayesian theory derives the probability from both data samples and prior knowledge in a
consistent manner, and thus uses broader set of information than the textbook econometrics.
Decision rules select one of possible actions of decision makers according to its outcomes in
different states of the world and their subjective probabilities. See Appendix III.
Decision tree is a tool for analysing decision problems with high degree of uncertainty. Outcomes
of decisions are represented in the tree, and – according to the expected values – the best sequence
of decisions is determined.
Dynamic programming is an approach to solving a sequence of decision problems. The
algorithms selecting optimal decisions work in a backward way, from the final decision to the first
one.
Good decision offers the best chance of success to meet the target in the time of the decision. Due
to uncertainty, the good decision does not guarantee a good outcome.
Inertia assumption states that a decision maker chooses an alternative to the current state only if
this alternative is better.
Minimax algorithm selects the action of a decision-maker that gives the best outcome in the least
favourable state of the world.
Monte Carlo simulations provide probability distributions for output variables by generating
random numbers as values of uncertain variables in the model.
Pay-off is an evaluation (usually numerical) of the outcome of a selected action of a decision
maker under specific state of the world.
Pay-off matrix is a tool of decision analysis showing a pay-off for each combination of possible
states of the world with possible actions of a decision-maker.
Robust control methods are mathematical methods that search for optimum solutions under
uncertainty.
Subjective probability is a probability attached to a certain event by a decision maker according
to her intuition without using statistical methods.Targeting inflation under uncertainty: Policy makers’ perspective   33
Appendix III – Examples of Decision Rules
The Laplace Rule
According to this decision rule, each set of alternative assumptions is treated as equally probable.
Probability attached to each of the three alternatives in our example is therefore 1/3. For each of
the three possible policy reactions, the expected pay-off value is then calculated. See Table III.1.
The rule selects the policy reaction with the best expected pay-off, which in our example, is the
lowest expected distance of the inflation from the target. We assume that the inflation target is
symmetrical, and that both overshooting and undershooting the target imply an equal loss for
policy makers.













Reduce rates 0 3 5 8/3
No change -1 1 4 4/3
Increase rates -5 0.5 2.5 -2/3
The Maximin Rule
This decision rule is called the pessimist’s rule because it aims at avoiding large losses. It is an
analogy to the rule discussed in Cagliarini, Heath (2000) and Tetlow, von zur Muehlen (2000).
The rule finds the worst pay-off for each of the three possible policy reactions. See Table III.2.
Then the policy reaction with the minimal worst pay-off is selected.













Reduce rates 0 3 5 5
No change -1 1 4 4
Increase rates -5 0.5 2.5 -5
The Maximax Rule
This decision rule is called the optimist’s rule because it selects the policy reaction that can lead to
the best pay-off under specific circumstances. The rule finds the best pay-off for each of the three
possible policy reactions. See Table III.3. Then the policy reaction with the best of the best pay-
offs is selected.34  Kateřina Šmídková












Reduce rates 03 50
No change -1 1 4 1
Increase rates -5 0.5 2.5 0.5
The Minimum Regret Rule
This decision rule is sometimes called the most cautious rule. In the first step, it is necessary to
construct the regret matrix from the pay-off matrix. Each element of the regret matrix is equal to
the best pay-off for a given alternative set of assumptions minus the pay-off from the original pay-
off matrix. See Table III.4. In the second step, the highest regret is selected for each possible
policy reaction. Then the policy reaction with the smallest regret (out of the highest regrets) is
selected.














Reduce rates 0-0 0.5-3 2.5-5 -2.5
No change 0-(-1) 0.5-1 2.5-4 -1.5
Increase rates 0-(-5) 0.5-0.5 2.5-2.5 5
The Rule of the Best Expected Value
This decision rule is often referred to as the rational rule. It requires attachment of relative
probabilities to all alternative sets of assumptions. See Table III.5. This rule is similar to the
Laplace rule. The expected pay-off value is calculated for each of the three possible policy
reactions. The rule selects the policy reaction with the best expected pay-off.
Table III.5 – Pay-off Matrix: The Best Expected Value












Reduce rates 0 3 5 2
No change -1 1 4 0.5
Increase rates -5 0.5 2.5 -1.5Targeting inflation under uncertainty: Policy makers’ perspective   35
The Best of the Most Probable Rule
This decision rule is also sometimes called the optimist’s rule, because it only works with the
most likely set of assumptions. This rule also requires attachment of probabilities to all alternative
sets of assumptions. The most likely set of assumptions is selected. See Table III.6. Then the
policy reaction that produces the best pay-off under the most likely set of assumptions is selected.
Table III.6 – Pay-off Matrix: The Best of the Most Probable









Reduce rates 0 3 5
No change -1 1 4
Increase rates -5 0.5 2.5
The most likely situation 0.536  Kateřina Šmídková
References
AMANO R., COLETTI D., MACKLEM T.(1999) Monetary rules when economic behaviour changes,
in Hunt B., Orr A. (editors) Monetary policy under uncertainty, proceedings from
Workshop held at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 29–30 June, 1998.
BALL L. (2000) Policy Rules and External Shocks, NBER Working Paper No. 7910.
BATTINI N., HALDANE A. (1999) Forward-looking Rules for Monetary Policy, in Taylor J. B. ed.
Monetary Policy Rules, The University of Chicago Press.
BEROGGI G. (1998) Decision Modeling in Policy Management: An Introduction to the Analytic
Concepts, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
BLINDER A.S. (1998) Central Banking in Theory and Practice, The MIT Press.
BLINDER A. (1999) Critical Issues for Modern Major Central Bankers, in Monetary Policy-
Making under Uncertainty, Proceedings from the ECB/CFS Conference.
BLIX M., SELLIN P. (1999) Inflation forecasts with uncertainty intervals, Quarterly Review No. 2,
Sveriges Riksbank, pp. 12–28.
BRAINARD W. (1967) Uncertainty and the effectiveness of policy, American Economic Review
57, pp. 411–425.
BRITTON E., FISHER P., WHITLEY J. (1998) The Inflation reports projections: understanding the
Fan Chart, Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, February, pp. 30–37.
BUDD  A. (1998) Economic Policy, with and without Forecasts, Bank of England, Quarterly
Bulletin, November, pp. 379–384.
CAGLIARINI  A., HEATH  A. (2000) Monetary Policy-making in the Presence of Knightian
Uncertainty Research Discussion Paper No: 10, Reserve Bank of Australia.
CLEMENTS M., HENDRY D. (1994) Towards a Theory of Economic Forecasting, in C. Hargreaves
(ed.) Non-stationary Time-series Analysis and Cointegration, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, pp. 9–52.
DREW A., HUNT B. (1999) The effects of potential output uncertainty on the performance of
simple policy rules, in Hunt B., Orr A. (editors) Monetary policy under uncertainty,
proceedings from Workshop held at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 29-30 June, 1998.
FREEDMAN CH. (1999) Monetary Policy Making and Uncertainty, in Monetary Policy-Making
under Uncertainty, Proceedings from the ECB/CFS Conference
GERAATS P. M. (2001) Why adopt transparency? The publication of central bank forecasts, ECB
Working Paper No. 41.
HALDANE, A (1995)  Introduction, in Haldane A (ed.) Targeting Inflation, Bank of England,
London.
HALDANE A. G., SALMON CH. K. (1995) Three Issues on inflation targets, in Haldane A (ed.)
Targeting Inflation, Bank of England, London.
HALL S., SALMON CH., YATES T., BATINI N. (1999) Uncertainty and simple monetary policy
rules - An illustration for the United Kingdom, Bank of England Working Papers, No 96.
HICKS J. (1931) The Theory of Uncertainty and Profit, Economica, Vol. 11, pp.170–89.Targeting inflation under uncertainty: Policy makers’ perspective   37
HRNČÍŘ M., ŠMÍDKOVÁ K. (2001) The Czech Approach to Inflation Targeting in Dickinson D.G.
and Mullineux A.W. (ed.) Financial and Monetary Integration in the New Europe, Edward
Elgar, UK.
HUNT  B., ORR  A. (1999) Introduction in Hunt B., Orr A. (editors) Monetary policy under
uncertainty, proceedings from Workshop held at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 29–30
June, 1998.
MONETARY POLICY REPORTS (2000–2002) Bank of Canada.
INFLATION REPORTS (2000–2002) Bank of England.
INFLATION REPORTS (1998–2002) Czech National Bank.
INFLATION REPORTS (1998–2002) Sveriges Riksbank.
ISARD  P., LAXTON  D. (1999) Monetary policy with NAIRU uncertainty and endogenous
credibility: Perspectives on policy rules and the gains from experimentation and
transparency, in Hunt B., Orr A. (editors) Monetary policy under uncertainty, proceedings
from Workshop held at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 29–30 June, 1998.
ISARD  P., LAXTON  D., ELIASSON  A. (1999) Simple monetary policy rules under model
uncertainty, IMF working paper, May.
ISSING O. (1999) The Monetary Policy of the ECB in a World of Uncertainty, in Monetary Policy-
Making under Uncertainty, Proceedings from the ECB/CFS Conference
KEYNES J. M. (1936) General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan, London.
KNIGHT F.H. (1921) Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Boston, Houghton Mifflin.
LAFFONT J., ET AL (1989) The Economics of Uncertainty and Information, MIT Press.
LAPLACE  P.S. (1795) A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities. 1951 translation, New York:
Dover.
LEIDERMAN L. (1999) Some Lessons from Israel, in Monetary Policy-Making under Uncertainty,
Proceedings from the ECB/CFS Conference.
LEITEMO  K., SÖDERSTRÖM  U. (2001) Simple Monetary Policy Rules and Exchange Rate
Uncertainty, Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series, No 122.
LEVIN A., WIELAND  V., WILLIAMS  J.C. (1999) Robustness of Simple monetary policy rules
under model uncertainty, in Taylor J. B. ed. Monetary Policy Rules, The University of
Chicago Press.
MACKLEM T. (2002) Information and Analysis for Monetary Policy: Coming to a Decision, Bank
of Canada Review, Summer, pp. 11–18.
MISHKIN  F. S., ESTRELLA  A. (1999) Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy:
Implications of Model Formulation and Uncertainty, in Taylor J. B. ed. Monetary Policy
Rules, The University of Chicago Press.
MISHKIN F.S., SCHMITT-HEBBEL K. (2001) One Decade of Inflation Targeting in the World:
What Do We Know and What do We Need to Know , NBER Working paper No 8397.
MONETARY POLICY STATEMENTS (2000-2002) Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
VON NEUMANN J., MORGENSTERN O. (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. 1953
edition, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
ORPHANIDES A. (1998) Monetary Policy Evaluation with Noisy Information, The Federal Reserve
Board Finance and Economics Discussion Series, No 50.38  Kateřina Šmídková
PAGAN  A. (2002) What is a good macroeconomic model for a central bank to use, in
Macroeconomic Models for Monetary Policy, Conference proceedings, FRBSF.
POLOZ S., ROSE D., TETLOW R. (1994) The Bank of Canada´s new Quarterly Projection Model
(QPM): An introduction, Bank of Canada Review, Autumn, pp. 23–38.
RBNZ (2000) Independent review of monetary policy: submission by the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand - Reserve Bank supporting papers, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
RENY P. J., JEHLE G. A. (1998) Advanced Microeconomic Theory, Addison-Wesley Pub.
SALMON CH., MARTIN B. (1999) Should uncertain monetary policymakers do less?, in Hunt B.,
Orr A. (editors) Monetary policy under uncertainty, proceedings from Workshop held at the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 29–30 June, 1998.
SIMS  CH. (2001) Pitfalls of a Minimax Approach to Model Uncertainty, Discussion paper,
Department of Economics, Princeton University.   
SIMS CH. (2002) The Role of Models and Probabilities in the Monetary Policy Process, paper
prepared for Fall 2002 meeting of the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity.
SGHERRI S., WALLIS K. F. (1997) Inflation Target Bands and the Bank of England's Fairly
Substantial Lump of Inflation Uncertainty, ESRC Macroeconomic Modelling Bureau
Discussion Paper No. 49, University of Warwick.
SHUETRIM G., THOMPSON CH.(1999) The implications of uncertainty for monetary policy, in
Hunt B., Orr A. (editors) Monetary policy under uncertainty, proceedings from Workshop
held at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 29–30 June, 1998.
SKINNER D.C. (1999) Introduction to Decision Analysis (2nd Edition), Probabilistic Publishing.
SMETS F. (1999) Output gap uncertainty: Does it matter for the Taylor rule?, in Hunt B., Orr A.
(editors) Monetary policy under uncertainty, proceedings from Workshop held at the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 29–30 June, 1998.
ŠMÍDKOVÁ  K. (1999) Měnově-rozhodovací proces: nejistota a role prognóz The Monetary
Policy Decision-Making Process: Uncertainty and the Role of Forecasts, Bulletin of the
Czech Economic Society, November.
SROUR G. (1999) Inflation targeting under uncertainty, Bank of Canada, Technical report no. 85.
SVENSSON L. (1996) Inflation forecast targeting: implementing and monitoring inflation targets,
Bank of England Working Paper No. 56.
TAYLOR J. (1993) Discretion versus policy rules in practice, Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy, 39, pp. 195–214.
TAYLOR J. (1999) Comments on Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty, in Hunt B., Orr A. (editors)
Monetary policy under uncertainty, proceedings from Workshop held at the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand, 29–30 June, 1998.
TETLOW R. J., VON ZUR MUEHLEN P. (2000) Robust monetary policy with Misspecified models:
Does model uncertainty always cal for attenuated policy?, Federal Reserve Board Finance
and Economics Discussion Series No 2000/28.
TETLOW R. J., VON ZUR MUEHLEN P., FINAN F. S . (1999) Learning and the complexity of
monetary policy rules, in Hunt B., Orr A. (editors) Monetary policy under uncertainty,
proceedings from Workshop held at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 29–30 June, 1998.
VICKERS  J. (1998) Inflation Targeting in Practice: the UK Experience, Bank of England,
Quarterly Bulletin, November, pp. 368–375.Targeting inflation under uncertainty: Policy makers’ perspective   39
WALLIS K. F. (forthcoming) Forecast uncertainty, its representation and evaluation, Bulletin:
EU & US Inflation and Macroeconomic Analysis, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
WALD A. (1950) Statistical Decision Functions. New York: Wiley.CNB INTERNAL RESEARCH AND POLICY NOTES




Inflation targeting: To forecast or to simulate?Czech National Bank
Economic Research Department
Na Příkopě 28, 115 03 Praha 1
Czech Republic
phone: +420 2 244 12 321
fax: +420 2 244 14 278
e-mail: eva.grenarova@cnb.cz